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Abstract
Whether they know it or not, countries are viewed through the lens of 
branding. Their brand equity lies in the norms and ideas that they 
project, as well as the actors (leaders) who champion such ideas and 
norms. Countries embody signs, beliefs, values, and imageries about 
what they stand for in the global system, and it is this that has an effect 
upon the imagery and preferences of others rather than merely market­
ing techniques. As such, countries carry — or project —  a 'persona' that 
expresses their identity, ideas, values, and norms.
This article focuses on the regional dimensions of South Africa's 
brand value and leadership. This is precisely because regions are cru­
cial platforms through which countries project their ideas, norms, and 
leadership. It is also here that they build their brand equity. As such, this 
article examines the kinds of norms that South Africa projects through 
the region, and understands how these are perceived. Further, it 
analyses the predominant ideas that South Africa articulates.
1. Introduction
Nation branding is an important consideration in foreign policy articula­
tion and diplomatic practice. The study of how nations brand them-
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selves and the effectiveness of such activity for foreign policy is still a 
relatively new field. This article looks at South Africa's leadership 
projection in the region from the point of view of nation branding. Nation 
branding is different to the branding exercise undertaken for tangible 
products, because nations value and embody their intangible assets 
such as identity, culture, and values. The 'feel' of a nation is not the 
same as that of a product. There might be something about the look 
and feel of the log or flag, but this is not what ultimately shapes or alters 
perceptions about the country to outsiders.
The leading nation branding expert, Simon Anholt, notes that "A 
nation's brand image is its most valuable asset: it is national identity 
made robust, tangible, communicable, and — at its best — made use­
ful" (Anholt 2002: 187). The interest of this article is to look closely at 
foreign policies as embodying a country’s national identity and value 
system.
While there is value to marketing a country — the beauty of its 
geography, the richness of its history, the friendliness of its people, and 
its business climate —  this is but a composite aspect of what nation 
branding is about. Unlike products, countries are complex organisations 
whose interaction with the world reflects both internal political contesta­
tions (between different political persuasions and among the fractions 
of the elite), conception of their identity, and how they perceive their 
place in the world to be.
Nation branding, as Anholt (2002) argues, needs to be based on 
a long-term strategy for the country and its place in the world. Policy 
thrust, organisational coordination, and execution are all critical in suc­
cessfully projecting a nation's brand. This article reviews South Africa's 
regional leadership from a nation branding point of view. It then identi­
fies challenges and opportunities in executing this task.
The rest of the article is structured along four sections. The first 
makes a case for why nation branding should explicitly form part of 
foreign policy. This section also offers a conceptual definition of nation 
branding and traces the sources of its influence. Second, I take a brief 
overview of South Africa's regional involvement, and how the lack of a 
conscious nation branding effort limits the dividends that the country 
could potentially harvest. Third, I highlight the challenges that nation 
branding is confronted with, focusing on the role of leadership and the 
emergence of city-branding. Fourth, I offer some tentative ideas on how 
South Africa's foreign policy could incorporate a thinking on nation
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branding, and thereby enhancing its place and role in the world. The 
final section is a conclusion, which pulls together some key insights on 
nation branding and foreign policy.
2. Why nation branding is important for 
foreign policy?
The shrinking space of the nation-state in the global system has cata­
pulted into prominence the discipline and practice of nation branding. In 
this article, nation branding is understood as entailing a nation's per­
ceived identity, values, and priorities. The field of nation branding has 
many influences, and traces its origins in studies on country of origin, 
place or destination branding, public diplomacy, and studies on national 
identity (Dinnie 2008; Fan 2006; Melissen 2005; Kotler and Gertner 
2002). Nation branding should not be seen as just about place or des­
tination branding, where emphasis is laid on the external attractiveness 
of a country, especially for tourists. Rather it is comprehensive and en­
capsulates the identity, values, and goals or priorities of a country —  all 
the elements that are part of foreign policies of countries. It, therefore, 
makes sense that the study of nation branding is given a place of pride 
in foreign policy analysis rather than be an exclusive preserve of mar­
keting and international communication. Unlike with a product, nation 
branding is not directed at others so they could buy a piece of the coun­
try or even its products, although exports may be a part of it, but cru­
cially it sells a particular idea —  or ideology1* of a country —  as part of a 
legitimating discourse of signs, meanings, and representations. Logos, 
colours, textures, certain sloganeering are all part of it, although they 
are not its totality.
As Fan (2006: 3) puts it, "a brand is more than just a name; it is a 
complex bundle of images, meanings, and experiences in the mind of 
people". It is about representation of something other than just a coun­
try as a physical space. According to Kotler and Gertner (2002) brands 
differentiate products; they represent a promise of value; and they incite 
beliefs, evoke emotions, and prompt behaviour. What a country stands 
for matters in international relations. It affects how others regard it. It 
does matter whether a country is seen as an honest broker in interna­
tional negotiations and the extent to which it delivers on its commit­
ments. So, the notion of nation branding is more textured than that of 
selling a product abroad. It shapes and informs the language of foreign
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policy, and the art of diplomacy, although not everything that goes by 
the name of diplomacy lends itself positively from a brand equity point 
of view.
Although they are distinct concepts, public diplomacy and nation 
branding share conceptual boundaries with a great deal of overlap. Pub­
lic diplomacy targets the general public, including individuals and non­
governmental organisations, in foreign societies, while nation-building is 
identity-focused and goal-directed —  and often directed at both state 
and non-state agencies. According to Melissen (2005: 6), "public diplo­
macy is initiated by practitioners, whereas branding is about the mobil­
ization of all nation's forces that can contribute to the promotion of its 
image abroad". Like nation branding, public diplomacy is a soft instru­
ment. They are both aimed at winning hearts and minds. In this sense, 
they exhibit soft power, which as Nye points out, "rests on the ability to 
shape the preferences of others" (Nye 2004:5).
As such, soft power, a crucial ingredient in both public diplomacy 
and nation branding, seeks to influence the imaginary and perception of 
others in a congenial direction. Essentially, soft-power is more about 
attractiveness rather than influence, since the latter can be achieved by 
various other means, including through coercive instruments. Building a 
nation’s brand is about cultivating the power of attractiveness of the 
extant political leadership, the values that a country embodies, its iden­
tity, its cultural resources, its material symbols (such as commercial 
brands) and its physical spaces. Indeed, the sources of soft power are 
culture, political values, and foreign policy, especially its legitimacy and 
the credibility of those who preside over it (Nye 2004:11). In this respect, 
soft-power can be seen as a marrow of nation branding.
There is another way in which nation branding becomes a power­
ful socialising tool to gain cooperation of corporate entities through, for 
example, reference to the importance of building a country as an Inc2) 
So, reference to South Africa Inc, India Inc, America Inc — blends, sym­
bolically, powerful commercial entities and state elite projects across the 
border. This could find expression in the execution of commercial 
diplomacy, where state representatives and business leaders work to­
gether to conquer markets abroad, but doing so in a way that sells the 
country as a credible commercial actor. In another sense, it could also 
be projected in global networks such as the World Economic Forum 
where business leaders and state elites congeal and share platforms. 
The cohesiveness of fractions of elites of a country could be something
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that others see as attractive. The idea here regarding a SA Inc is that 
even though corporates and the state elites may have fundamental 
differences domestically, to the eye of the outsiders they must be seen 
to be making a positive impression by being seen to be speaking with 
one voice on certain issues, usually defined by state elites. This should 
not be the end of it since, if such an appearance of cohesiveness is not 
authentic, the veneer will soon wear off. Crucially, there is a need for 
government and business to have a shared platform of legitimate social 
purpose that, primarily, is aimed at boosting national economic compet­
itiveness and enhancing the credibility of the country's economic policies 
both domestically and internationally.
Some of the objectives that countries pursue in promoting nation 
branding include: attracting tourism, stimulating inwards investment, 
and boosting exports, restoring international credibility and investor 
confidence; and promoting international stability (Chernatony 2008; 
Olins 2005). According to Olins (2005: 170-179), the three key areas 
over which countries' brands compete are exports, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), and tourism. It does matter what a country exports, 
since this is always associated with the country of origin, for example 
South African wine, Scotch whiskey, German automobile, Cuban cigar, 
or Korean or American electronics. There is also a subtle tinge of nation 
branding in geographic indications, for example, which have protection 
in international trade law.
The second area is that of corporate activities, in particular na­
tional champions both at home and abroad. In the case of India, Tata, 
Mahindra, and Infosys come to mind; General Electric and international 
oil companies in the case of the United States (US); China's telecom­
munications giant Fluawei and computer manufacturer, Lenovo; and 
South Africa's telecommunications and retail giants on the African con­
tinent. The third one is tourism, which is about place destination or 
cultural attractiveness of a country.
The currency of nation branding has also increased on the back 
of what Cerny (1999) characterises as the emergence of a 'competition 
state'. According to this perspective, the functions of the state are 
redefined to create conditions that are attractive to international capital, 
and that present the state as appealing —  a form of branding. The 
competition state, as Cerny (1999: 206) points out, exhibits four types 
of policy changes: a shift from macro-economic to micro-economic in­
terventionism; pursuit of competitive advantage as distinct from com-
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parative advantage; emphasis on inflation targeting and general neo­
liberal monetarism; and a shift from public welfare maximisation to the 
promotion of enterprise, innovation, and profitability in both private and 
public sectors. This is a re-articulation of a perspective laid out by Cox 
(1987) much earlier, when he suggested that, "The world market had 
become a realm of competition among unequal giants capable of man­
ipulating demand and of mobilising varying degrees of economic power 
and political influence". In the modern era, nation branding becomes a 
facility to shape perceptions in the external environment through the 
use of soft power.
Quite clearly, nation branding plays an important role "as a means 
to promote national identity while encouraging the economic benefits 
necessary to compete in a modern globalized world" (Aroncyzyk 2008: 
43). Government elites would promote a country's brand for several 
reasons or to achieve a number of goals that are aimed at generating 
goodwill from outsiders and to reap economic dividends from such 
efforts. Further, governments want to be seen by their citizens to be 
promoting domestic economic priorities, something that nation branding 
can be used as a lever for.
In an age where there is so much importance attached to global 
rankings, a country's standing, for example on the World Bank Doing 
Business Index, Transparency International Corruption Perception In­
dex, and World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index 
among others, is appropriated for branding purposes if it is positive (and 
overlooked if negative) — to differentiate a country from those that are 
perceived to be doing poorly. Branding through association or align­
ment is another mechanism to build brand capital. Being part of 
prominent international groupings and clubs such as the G20, the 
African Union (AU), and the BRICS is seen as an asset for shoring up a 
country's identity and sense of prestige on the global stage. In this way, 
considerations of nation branding can influence approaches to foreign 
policy. Similarly, foreign policy choices, especially if they turn out to be 
positive, help to further reinforce brand equity.
Further, involvement in the G20 is instrumentalised to project 
South Africa as a system stabiliser, and a champion for Africa's interests; 
its participation in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), apart from 
articulating its own economic interests, has lent South Africa the status 
of a middle-power and a bridge-builder between the developing and the 
developed world; its activities in the AU positions it as an African coun-
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try first and committed to continental leadership; and in the BRICS, it 
lends itself to perceptions of a country that is on the rise and associated 
with increasingly influential countries in the world. Those who may want 
South Africa to be a member of the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD) may be driven by consideration 
that this would place the country in a favourable light as part of an 
exclusive rich-nations club that is a global standard setter, even though 
the domestic reality may narrate a different story. Punching above its 
weight in international fora has enabled South Africa to build brand 
equity. For citizens, a country's participation in global processes, and 
scoring good points in these avenues, could help to infuse a sense of 
confidence amongst the citizens or important social groups, even 
though these endeavours may not be accompanied by any tangible 
economic gain. It could be argued that much of foreign policy work is 
an exercise in nation branding.
Branding is an exercise that helps to transform the national and 
international image of a country (Aronczyk 2008: 44). It is possible that 
to the eyes of the citizens, a country's external relations may appear 
good, and they may very well have a positive sense of esteem about 
the role their country is playing on the continental and global stages. 
Yet, what is also important is how the outsiders view the country, in 
other words, what image does the country project outside its borders. In 
addition, it is also important how foreigners within national borders 
perceive the country's identity and value system. As Szondi (2008:12), 
put it: "One of the features of nation branding is that it considers do­
mestic and foreign citizens as equally important targets". It is not suffi­
cient to view one's identity only inwardly. Making improvements in 
nation branding requires a great deal of attention to the effect a coun­
try's policy has on the conceptions and preferences of those outside the 
country.
Consider the following examples: on international relations, coun­
tries such as Canada, Australia, and Scandinavian countries were re­
garded as middle-powers, not so much for the size of their economies, 
but for the kind of identity and role they were seen to be playing on 
multilateral issues. These countries were regarded as honest brokers, 
less hard-edged about advancing their narrow interests and more con­
cerned about brokering deals that are fair, and with deep commitment 
to multilateralism both as a principle and a process of resolving differ­
ences (see Cooper 1997; Van der Westhuizen 1998). At some point,
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South Africa was viewed through the same lens, in particular with re­
spect to the role that it played in multilateral trade negotiation from the 
late 1990s to the beginning of the Doha Round.
When the International Marketing Council of South Africa (IMC) 
was established in August 2000, this was with the intention of closing 
the gap between how the country was perceived and its reality in the 
global market place (Johnstone 2008: 5). In a sense, conscious nation 
branding is something that is still relatively new in South Africa, al­
though the country has been projecting a particular brand to outsiders, 
both before democracy and alter the democratic government came into 
being in 1994. As Johnstone (2008: 5) points out, developing a com­
pelling national brand, defining the relationship between the core brand 
custodian and other activities that may have also been involved in 
brand promotion, for example destination marketing and setting out a 
clear strategy to follow in promoting nation branding, were at the heart 
of the work of this agency at its creation. Changing international percep­
tions, and ensuring congruence between this perception and the com­
mitments of the country were some of the goals of this brand building 
endeavor.
Nation branding is not an end in itself, but a means to project 
identity, values, goals, and a sense of purpose in international relations. 
Anholt (2008: 22) warns that, "governments should never do things 
purely for brand-related reasons; no action should be dedicated to image 
management alone". It is not just the style and pomp that matters, nor 
being seen in every international event, but it is the identity and the 
purpose that a country articulates on international platforms that is 
important. It is thus important that nation-building is approached stra­
tegically rather than functionally or tactically as a matter of techniques 
to win the game of recognition. This point is aptly made by Szondi 
(2008: 5), when he points out that nation branding should be seen in 
terms of "strategic self-presentation of a country with the aim of creating 
reputational capital through economic, political, and social interest pro­
motion at home and abroad".
Anholt (2013:1-2) identifies three components of nation branding. 
The first is what he refers to as strategy, which entails knowing who a 
nation is and where it stands today (both in reality and according to 
internal and external perceptions). The second is substance, which is 
about effective execution of that strategy in the form of new economic, 
legal, political, social, cultural, and educational activity. The final one is
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symbolic action, which covers particular species of substance that hap­
pen to have an intrinsic communicative power, including innovations, 
structures, legislation, reforms, investments, institutions or policies that 
are suggestive or memorable. Measured against these, South Africa 
would appear limping: there are still inconclusive debates about South 
Africa's precise identity, and still battles with external (continental) per­
ceptions that it is anti-African in the way it treats nationals from other 
African countries, either through hurdles in the visa system or hostility of 
South African citizens towards outsiders, especially of African origin. 
There seems to be no clear substance of ideas that is compelling in 
South Africa's foreign policy stance, and its rationale both in the African 
continent and the world has lost its edge.
An important challenge for South Africa is to consciously cultivate 
brand-building as part of its foreign policy, and to work to sustain its 
power of attraction. Nye (2011: 100) has cautioned that, "Sustained 
attraction —  being a city on a hill —  requires consistency of practice 
with values. Going further to project attraction, frame agendas, and 
persuade others is even more difficult". If a country cannot frame its 
agenda coherently, there is no clear sense of purpose about its foreign 
policy, and it is hard to discern where it stands on important issues in 
the world, its nation branding exercise is an act in futility. South Africa's 
foreign policy since Zuma's administration has declined in stature. This 
is compounded by domestic political and economic challenges that 
seem to be intractable.
3. Nation branding and outlines of regional 
leadership
There is no doubt that South Africa's foreign policy has evolved in im­
portant ways since the country became a democracy in 1994. Despite 
its setbacks in the last seven years, the nation-brand equity is still much 
better than it was in the days of apartheid, although that is hardly a 
worthy benchmark to use since apartheid was condemned as a crime 
against humanity.
Post-apartheid, South Africa's international relations are shaped 
by the view that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy. The 
consideration that the country's development priorities and values should 
inform international relations is at the core of government's thinking. 
The African continent is identified as the centrepiece of South Africa's
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foreign policy, with greater weight placed on Southern Africa, including 
efforts to deepen regional integration. As the White Paper on Foreign 
Policy (2011) points out: "Since the birth of democratic South Africa in 
1994, the country has prioritised an Afro-centric foreign policy rooted in 
national liberation, the quest for African renewal, and efforts to negate 
the legacy of colonialism as well as neo-colonialism".
The early developments saw the country showing greater inclina­
tion towards an idealistic thrust, with various policy documents giving 
greater premium to issues related to human rights and peace-building. 
These remain pillars of South Africa's foreign policy. In underscoring the 
importance of the African continent for South Africa's economic diplo­
macy, during his 2013 budget speech, Pravin Gordhan, the former 
finance minister, pointed out that: "Africa is our home, and it is our future. 
It is a market of over one billion people and it is growing rapidly". He 
particularly highlighted the fact that the African continent accounts for 
roughly 18 per cent of South Africa's total exports, and nearly 25 per 
cent of its manufactured exports. Investing in the African continent holds 
possibilities for stimulating South African exports, while supporting de­
velopment in those countries. South Africa's medium-term strategic 
framework for 2014-2019 underlines the country’s intention to "continue 
to support regional and continental processes to respond to and resolve 
crises, promote peace and security, strengthen regional integration, sig­
nificantly increase intra-African trade, and champion sustainable devel­
opment in Africa" (Presidency 2014).
There is no doubting South Africa's desire to achieve these ob­
jectives; the South African government has been consistent in expres­
sing this posture. What is lacking, however, is a strategic orientation in 
the form of a credible leadership, clear ideas, and effective strategies to 
realise these objectives. It lacks the social power necessary to effect 
change in its immediate region. Steven Lukes (2005) saw one dimen­
sion of power as about ideals and beliefs that help to shape the initial 
preferences of others. Other African countries are not acquiescing to 
South Africa's putative leadership in the continent. South Africa has not 
cultivated a powerful brand that expresses what Nye (2011: 207-208) 
refers to as smart power, which is about the ability "to combine re­
sources into successful strategies in the new context of power diffusion 
and 'the rise' of the rest".
As Nye (2011: 2008) points out, smart power is predicated on 
five key questions: first, what key goals and outcomes are preferred?
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Second, what resources are preferred and in which contexts? Third, 
what are the positions and preferences of the targets of influence? 
Fourth, which forms of power behaviour are most likely to succeed? 
Fifth, what is the probability of success. There is no evidence of stra­
tegic process in foreign policy formulation and planning in South Africa 
that takes a total view of these questions, and ensures the alignment of 
various agencies (including business and NGOs) and other govern­
ment departments that are active externally to achieve clearly defined 
outcomes that position the nation brand favourably.
On the commercial diplomacy front, South Africa needs to com­
bine both hard power (trade) and soft power to achieve outcomes. The 
hard-edge elements of South Africa's branding which, no doubt, would 
appeal more to its citizens, are those to do with commercial or eco­
nomic diplomacy —  export, investment, and tourism promotion. The 
National Development Plan (2012) asserts that South Africa should ag­
gressively expand trade and investment in the region, on the continent, 
and globally. Currently, much of South Africa's foreign policy is focused 
on processes, agreements, and events. These include the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEPAD), and the AU. In the past, South Africa has not consciously ap­
proached its regional relations from a nation branding point of view. It 
has also not appropriately gauged the perceptions of other African citi­
zens and elites of its role on the continent, leading to self-aggrandising 
rhetoric that has little resonance with the reality of its engagements on 
the continent.
Scholars such as Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan (1998: 12) 
have argued that South Africa's regional role can be understood in no 
other terms than as a selfish hegemon. They cited its dominance in key 
economic sectors in the sub-region, structural imbalances between 
South Africa and the rest of the sub-region, and the conduct of South 
Africa in trade negotiations, and concluded that, "there is a moral ob­
ligation for the new South Africa to engage Southern Africa in a positive 
manner". This may be stretching the point regarding South Africa's 
actual intention, but a deliberate branding exercise that includes a com­
munication strategy helps to dispel some of the misconceptions about 
the country. Take another study, for example, that yields responses that 
are unflattering for South Africa. Afield-based study by African scholars 
has revealed that "there is a marked difference between how South
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Africans as people and as a government see themselves and how the 
rest of the continent perceives them" (Schoeman, Kefale and Alden 
2017).
According to some of the interviews undertaken by these scholars, 
many Africans expressed disappointment with South Africa's conduct 
on three fronts. The first is with respect of the spate of xenophobic 
attacks that took place in both 2008 and 2015, with authorities taking 
longer to formulate a clear strategy to respond to these. The second is 
South Africa's perceived focus on its narrow interests in its participation 
in the BRICS and the G20, and ignoring wider African interests. The 
third is that South Africa’s foreign policy has contradicted itself at the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council and in the AU, citing South 
Africa's support for resolution 1973 that authorise Nato's (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation) intervention in Libya as an example. Further, ac­
cording to the views gathered by these scholars, South Africa is per­
ceived as acting in a manner that bullies other small African countries in 
the AU. These may not be based on hard evidence, but the mere fact 
that such perceptions exist and are strongly expressed is indicative of 
South Africa’s waning credibility on the continent, and this bodes ill for 
its brand.
The point is not for South Africa to brand itself as either a benign 
hegemon whose task is to simply dispense aid or to aggressively push 
commercial interests in the region, but to be more nuanced and bal­
anced on how it articulates its own interests as part of doing good for the 
continent, and to confidently market its positive attributes. This nuanced 
approach is set out in a research report by Smith-Hohn and De Kock 
(2015:4) of Brand SA. The highlight pillars of South Africa's good repu­
tation: professionalism in its hard power resources such as the military; 
maintaining a credible multilateralist profile across the continent, some­
thing that is a soft power attribute; and sustaining a normative drive in 
foreign policy engagement. It is also important that South Africa listens 
more, engages more empathetically with its counterparts, places less 
emphasis on formal leadership while gathering strength to assert its 
moral leadership and soft power, supported by good governance, ef­
fective stewardship of its economy, and credible leadership domestic­
ally. None of this should mean South Africa loses its will to lead, and 
ceases to identify and pursue its interest with a sense of purpose and 
determination in the African continent.
20
Strategic Review tor Southern Africa, Vol 39, No 1 Mzukisi Qobo
4. Challenges to nation branding
South Africa has not consciously thought about its regional leadership 
in terms of nation branding. There are instances where this thinking has 
been implicit, and tacitly expressed. There is a need to close the gap 
between nation branding and projection of regional leadership. In cases 
where South Africa's regional leadership has improved the country's 
brand value, this has not been proactively cultivated.
There are various challenges that would need to be considered 
in thinking about nation branding. Chernatoy (2008: 16), notes that 
"successful brands thrive because the people delivering the brand act 
in a manner that reflects the promised value". The first challenge is that 
of leadership and its conduct. If the political leadership of a country is 
perceived negatively, the nation as a brand suffers. It makes it harder to 
build productive international relations or to attract foreign direct invest­
ment if political leadership is perceived to be corrupt or corruptible, or if 
trust in public officials is very low, and if state-society relations are frac­
tious. One of the key questions in measuring the strength of brand 
equity should thus be the perception of a country's political leadership 
at any point in time.
This also applies to internal and external perceptions about 
corporate leaders. Are they seen as shining examples in adhering to 
corporate governance standards? How do they measure on corporate 
social investment? Are they viewed in a positive light with respect to 
stakeholder engagement? Are they a force for good or a force for bad 
for society? And do they comport themselves well across the border? 
All these factors, both political and commercial, have an impact on the 
quality of nation branding. Importantly, a country needs to maintain 
consistency between the message (and values) it articulates in rhetoric, 
and what it does in the conduct of its foreign policy abroad. It is also for 
this reason that government needs to engage stakeholders — especially 
business stakeholders —  in setting out the outlines for its branding, and 
in executing its economic diplomacy abroad.
It is worth highlighting aspects of the National Planning Commis­
sion's (2012) National Development Plan (NDP) report that have a 
bearing on the country's international relations, and that reveal the 
weaknesses of foreign policy leadership. Chapter 7 of the National 
Planning Commission's (NPC) NDP report is devoted to international 
relations. It proposes that international relations be driven by the coun-
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try’s domestic economic, political, and social demands, if challenges 
such as eradicating poverty, lowering inequality and creating jobs are to 
be achieved.
Accordingly, it recommended that the country's national priorities 
be defined. In addition, it asserted that South Africa should aggressively 
expand trade and investment in the region, on the continent, and glob­
ally. This is something that can be achieved if there is better coordination 
across the different agencies dealing with economic issues, enhanced 
interaction with industry, and there is sufficient technical capacity within 
the foreign ministry to drive economic diplomacy — all of which are cur­
rently lacking.
The NPC decries what it sees as South Africa's "relative decline 
in power and influence in world affairs", further noting that "South Africa 
lost a great deal of the moral authority —  as a power source —  that the 
country enjoyed in the period immediately after the 1994 elections". 
The NPC went on to state that South Africa's foreign relations are 
becoming ineffective, with the country experiencing a drop in global 
competitiveness and moral standing. It attributes this decline to what it 
calls "the overall demise of the golden age of [South Africa's] African 
diplomacy, spanning 1998 to 2008". According to the NPC's assess­
ment, even on the African continent, South Africa's standing has de­
clined, with the country having a weak grasp of Africa's geopolitical 
situation, and with "policy makers vacillating between leading and mud­
dling through on issues of integration and cooperation".
While this critique may be harsh, it does underline weaknesses 
in the country's policy thrust, coordination, and strategy execution —  all 
critical functions of leadership. These have a bearing on the country's 
brand equity. Second, in the contemporary world nation branding has a 
competitor in the form of city-branding. The role of cities as magnets for 
foreign direct investment and tourism is growing in prominence. Kotler 
and Kotler (2014: 8) argue that, "City building, not nation building has 
been the key to the rise of emerging markets". This is especially so, as 
the two authors point out, since cities are intensively productive en­
vironments ripe for infrastructure development and various kinds of 
commercial activities. It is in cities that wealth is generated, that innova­
tion sparks are ignited, and where cultural power of attraction lies 
(Kotler and Kotler 2014:11).
Countries are increasingly viewed through the lens of their cities 
of opportunity. From a commercial point of view, it is cities or what are
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called mega-cities where industrial clustering takes place, which in turn 
create an external appeal. Barber (2013:4) makes a similar point in his 
observation that the city rather than the nation-state is the agent of social 
change, as it is where creativity is unleashed, community developed, 
and citizenship realised. Ohmae (2004: xxv) saw region-states (that is 
regions within countries or mega-cities) as "the best units of prosperity 
on the global stage". These sub-national entities attract cross-border 
businesses, they have thriving tourism sectors, and because of their 
openness they tend to be seedbeds for innovation.
It is important, therefore, that nation branding is promoted in 
close coordination with the external orientation of cities, and to also 
draw lessons from how city practitioners go about promoting their cities. 
If, as Barber (2013: 63-69) contends, cities are centres of commerce 
and trade, and are magnets that pull capital, technology, and talent, 
nation-states need to rethink how they go about building nation-brand, 
at times using thriving cities to reinforce the credibility of their message. 
This point is also emphasised by De Kock and Peterson (2016) who 
contend that perception of cities reflect on the national brand and its 
reputation, and thus they need to consciously contribute to its cultivation.
While it is a reality that cities are growing in prominence, this 
should not be seen as portending the liquidation of the nation-state by 
forces of globalisation that privilege cities, and that nation branding 
efforts are superfluous. On the contrary, the rise of cities should be re­
garded as an asset. Importantly, as Anderson (2006: 3) has observed, 
the rally about the end of nationalism or the nation-state is far from 
materialising, and nation-ness remains "the most universally legitimate 
value in the political life of our time". What this means is that there 
should be a great deal of cooperation between the national and city 
level in promoting a country's place in the world and projecting a posit­
ive identity.
5. Key policy considerations for an 
efficacious nation branding in foreign 
policy in South Africa
Policy coherence is essential across the key departments that have 
relevance for foreign policy execution, starting with the Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). More resources need
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to be devoted to managing both economic diplomacy and strength­
ening relations with key partners on the continent. In light of the fact that 
nation branding is about effective expression of soft power, South Africa 
should advance its leadership consciously and purposefully to drive 
ideas about change on the continent.
Without clear communication of the country's strategy and ap­
proach to the region, it will be difficult to harvest gains from nation 
branding. Part of communications should be a deliberate strategy to 
actively highlight the country's positive contribution towards Africa's 
development, including the contribution of South African companies in 
corporate social investment projects in various parts of the continent.
Nation branding should not remain static. There are certain core 
values and ideals that form the essence of South Africa's identity that 
should be preserved. These include its commitment to the economic 
development of its citizens, peace-building and developmental partner­
ship on the African continent, a human rights thrust, and a commitment 
to global stability and peace. These are values that are consistent with 
its Constitutional framework. How these are promoted, and through 
which messages and with what diplomatic instruments, is something 
that should not be cast in stone. Flexibility and adaptability is important 
for executing an effective nation branding strategy. Consider for exam­
ple, the catch-phrase — "Alive with Possibility". This is vivid and projects 
a country of opportunity, but it could also be construed for other mean­
ings, such as a possibility for nasty surprises or of politicians behaving 
badly, and so on. Those involved in crafting mottos or slogans that are 
aimed at promoting nation brand should closely monitor the political 
temperature, sensitise those in power to the damage the behaviour of 
leaders or certain policies may have on the nation branding. Importantly, 
they need to test the "look and feel" of their brand and adopt tactics that 
could help to keep it real.
Nation branding should be central to foreign policy thinking and 
determination. It should not just be a component in the cluster system 
of government. Proximity to the sanctum of executive power is neces­
sary. The DIRCO-anchored Coordinated Forum on International Rela­
tions (CFIR), which is meant for sharing information on managing ex­
ternal engagements should have representation from the agency driving 
nation branding —  Brand South Africa. The Cabinet Legkotla took a de­
cision at the January 2007 meeting directing the International Relations, 
Peace, and Security Cluster to submit guidelines to cabinet on estab-
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lishing effective measures to manage international engagements. This 
forum is comprised of senior officials and is designed to meet twice a 
year. Its mandate is to facilitate sharing of information regarding stake­
holders' international involvement, policy statements, visits abroad, con­
ferences, and summits; provide foreign policy guidance on international 
issues; planning and coordinating incoming and outgoing international 
visits; and create a platform for possible private sector/civil society 
engagement.
In the 2013-2018 Strategic Plan, DIRCO laments that "divergent 
measures emanating from South Africa on foreign policy" is a risk man­
agement issue. Poor coordination of international relations efforts, includ­
ing contradictory approaches and duplication by sub-national entities 
could damage brand equity. The CFIR should move beyond adminis­
trative guidelines, and be re-oriented towards substantive policy en­
gagement across various agencies doing work that have implications 
for the country's international relations. It is a structure that would be 
best placed in the Presidency, and to work closely with the stream of 
work on International Relations in the NPC.
The lack of vitality of the CFIR and its absence of policy levers 
could potentially have a constraining effect on nation branding. The 
South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR) should also 
place nation branding at the heart of its agenda, as this could help focus 
attention on such important aspects as identity, values, and priorities for 
international engagements. Ideally, this is a structure that would be best 
placed in the Presidency, as a repository of ideas, insights, and strat­
egies at the high level.
There have been a number of studies undertaken by Brand South 
Africa on how the country is perceived by outsiders, with separate 
reports for Africa and the rest of the world. Drawing out insights from 
such studies and turning these into actionable plans, could help in 
advancing nation branding. Finally, South Africa needs to be explicit in 
communicating its achievements on the African continent, including 
those of its corporate entities, individual citizens, and non-governmental 
organisations, and appropriate these as part of its brand equity.
6. Conclusion
Many countries today view nation branding as integral to their foreign 
policies. Values, identity, and priorities are the substance of nation
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brands, and they should be essential in the conduct of foreign policies. 
Much of South Africa's foreign policy is focused on processes, agree­
ments, and events. These include SACU, SADC, NEPAD, and the AU. 
Apart from processes linked to continental institutions, considerable 
energy in South Africa's international relations has gone towards con­
flict resolution and peace-building efforts in both Southern and Central 
Africa.
South Africa has been adept at managing the political dimension 
of international relations on the continent, but the linkages between the 
political and the economic imperatives have generally been weak, 
leading to concerns that South Africa is not reaping sufficient economic 
dividends from its peace-building efforts on the African continent. Nation 
branding should generate value both in terms of influencing the percep­
tions of others about the country, and converting intangible resources 
for economic gains for the citizens. The ultimate effectiveness of nation 
branding should elevate the esteem of political leadership both in the 
eyes of outsiders and domestic constituencies.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that South Africa needs 
to frame a coherent agenda in its foreign policy, and be clear where it 
stands on important issues; be consistent in its messages; and crucially 
to ensure congruence between its professed values domestically and 
how it conducts itself abroad.
Endnotes
1. Here ideology is used in the sense of Terry Eagleton (2007) use of it as a 
discourse that expresses meanings, signs and representations
2. This refers to positioning or branding the country as if it were a business.
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